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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
HERRING, SARDINES, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DETERMINATION OF OPTI-
MUM YIELD UNDER THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
ACT OF 1976-Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043 (1st Cir.), remanded,
No. 77-45-SD (S.D. Me. Aug. 26, 1977), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1052 (1st
Cir. 1977).
The two decisions by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Maine v. Kreps1 are the first appellate decisions arising under the pro-
visions for judicial review of fishery management plans prepared pur-
suant to the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
(FCMA).2 In Maine, the court considered whether a preliminary man-
agement plan for the Northwest Atlantic herring fisheries complied
with the requirements of the FCMA.
The FCMA establishes the right of the United States to manage all
fishery resources within 200 miles of its coast,3 many of which are
presently depleted4 due to overfishing under prior management
1. 563 F.2d 1043 (1st Cir.) [hereinafter cited as Maine 1], remanded, No. 77-45-
SD (S.D. Me. Aug. 26, 1977), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1052 (Ist Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Maine II].
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1801-1882 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FCMA].
3. The FCMA establishes a "fishery conservation zone," the boundaries of which
are defined as follows:
The inner boundary of the fishery conservation zone is a line coterminous with the
seaward boundary of each of the coastal states, and the outer boundary of such
zone is a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles
from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.
FCMA § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976). The Act provides for the exercise of exclusive
fishery management authority by the United States over the following:
(1) All fish within the fishery conservation zone.
(2) All anadromous species throughout the migratory range of each such species
beyond the fishery conservation zone; except that such management authority shall
not extend to such species during the time they are found within any foreign na-
tion's territorial sea or fishery conservation zone (or the equivalent), to the extent
that such sea or zone is recognized by the United States.
(3) All Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond the fishery conservation zone.
Id. § 102, 16 U.S.C. § 1812. The Act, however, excludes management authority over
certain species of tuna. Id. § 103, 16 U.S.C. § 1813. See note 65 infra.
4. The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries concluded,
[M] any of the important American fish stocks have been over-exploited, some,
like haddock, to the point of essentially commercial extinction, and many others
are threatened with a similar fate. The Committee concludes that the depletion of
these stocks is in large measure attributable to the phenomenal increase in recent
years in the number of technologically sophisticated and very efficient foreign fish-
ing vessels in waters off United States coasts ....
H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-44 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 611, and SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE & NAT'L OCEAN
POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., 2D. SEsS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSER-
VATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, 1051, 1094-95 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The Committee then lists 81 species of fish under
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schemes. 5 The Act establishes eight Regional Councils6 and directs
them to formulate a management plan for each fishery within their re-
spective areas.7 If a Council fails to develop a plan, the Secretary of
Commerce may prepare a "preliminary" management plan for that
fishery. 8 Each plan must establish the amount of fish, designated the
"optimum yield,"9 which can be harvested annually from a fishery.
Optimum yield is determined by increasing or decreasing a biologi-
cally determined number, labeled the fishery's "maximum sustainable
U.S. management which are presently either "depleted," in "imminent danger of deple-
tion," or under "intensive use." Id. at 95-98, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
at 1149-53. The Senate Committee on Armed Services also found that "due to massive
overfishing off both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, U.S. coastal fishery stocks have been
steadily depleted. The depletion of some stocks has been so severe that they have be-
come virtually extinct for purposes of commercial fishing." S. REP. No. 94-515, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra at 569, 572.
5. Legislative history indicates that past state, national, and international fishery
management programs have generally been unsuccessful in their efforts to conserve the
fish stocks off the coast of the United States. See H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 42 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 609-10, and
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051, 1093; S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10-11 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 655, 664-65; S.
REP. No. 94-515, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, SU-
pra note 4, at 569, 573.
6. FCMA § 302(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a) (1976).
7. Id. § 302(h)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1).
8. The FCMA authorizes the Secretary to prepare a fishery management plan if the
appropriate Council fails to submit a plan within a reasonable time or if the Secretary
disapproves of a plan and the Council fails to make changes requested by the Secretary.
Id. § 304(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1).
The management plan challenged in Maine v. Kreps was prepared pursuant to
FCMA § 2 0 1(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (1976). It authorized the Secretary to prepare a
preliminary management plan for a fishery if a foreign nation applied for a permit for
that fishery and the Secretary determined that no plan would be prepared by the applica-
ble Regional Council by Mar. 1, 1977. Id.
9. Optimum yield is defined as follows:
[T] he amount of fish-
(A) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with particular
reference to food production and recreational opportunities; and
(B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield
from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological fac-
tor.
Id. § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18). The Senate Conference Committee explained why the
optimum yield figure is more desirable than the maximum sustainable yield figure:
[Mlany experts believe that use of the maximum sustainable yield objective
in fisheries management may lead to substantial economic waste and may ignore
important environmental relationships between stocks from which yields cannot be
maximized simultaneously. It seems more desirable therefore to adopt the objec-
tive of optimum yield, defined to include the maximum yield as the basic standard
of reference, as modified by relevant economic, social, and/or ecological factors.
S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, at-655, 676-77. For other views on the advantages of the "optimum yield"
management goal, see OPTIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD AS A CONCEPT IN FISHERIES MAN-
AGEMENT (P. Roedel ed. 1975) (proceedings of a symposium held during the 104th
Annual Meeting of the American Fisheries Society, Honolulu, Hawaii, Sept. 9, 1974).
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yield," 10 to accommodate "relevant economic, social, or ecological
factors" so that the "overall benefit to the Nation" derived from the
fishery is maximized. 11 Judicial review of fishery management plans
and preliminary management plans is provided under the FCMA and
the Administrative Procedure Act. 12
In Maine v. Kreps,13 the State of Maine 14 brought suit to enjoin the
10. Maximum sustainable yield was defined by the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries as "the surplus production of the fishery; the safe upper limit of
harvest which can be taken consistently year after year without diminishing the stock so
that the stock is truly inexhaustible and perpetually renewable." H.R. REP. No. 94-445,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 593,
615, and LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051, 1098. The Senate Commerce
Committee also defined maximum sustainable yield as that point "when the annual
catch from a fishery is at the highest level, in terms of number or weight of fish caught,
which can be sustained without harming the reproductive ability of the stock and which
assures a similar level of harvest in the next year." S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 21 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 655, 676.
11. FMCA § 3(18), 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18) (1976).
12. Id. § 305(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1855(d) (1976); 5 U.S.C. §8 701-06 (1976). The
FCMA provides as follows:
Regulations promulgated by the Secretary under this chapter shall be subject to ju-
dicial review to the extent authorized by, and in accordance with, chapter 7 of Title
5, if a petition for such review is filed within 30 days after the date on which the reg-
ulations are promulgated; except that (1) section 705 of such title is not applicable,
and (2) the appropriate court shall only set aside any such regulation on a ground
specified in section 706(2)(A), (B), (C), or (D) of such title.
FCMA § 305(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1855(d) (1976) (emphasis added). Although this section
provides only for a limited review of regulations, it is reasonable to conclude that the
provision was also intended to include the review of management plans. Regulations
are prepared in order to implement the determinations reached in management plans.
Id. § 201(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(g). A party should, therefore, be able to challenge a
plan to the extent that a regulation is based on that plan. Comment, Judicial Review of
Fishery Management Regulations Under the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976, 52 WAsH. L. REV. 599, 631-32 (1977).
Legislative history provides little help in determining the congressional purpose be-
hind the inclusion of § 305(d) in the FCMA. Only one sentence of legislative explana-
tion discusses this provision:
Regulations to implement a fishery management plan are subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. ch. 7), if a petition for judicial
review of such regulations is filed within 30 days after the date of promulgation
except that the reviewing court is without authority to enjoin the implementation
of those regulations pending the judicial review ....
S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 660, 678, and LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 37, 90. How-
ever, even if § 3 05(d) is interpreted to apply only to the review of regulations, judicial
review of management plans could still be maintained under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (1976). Recent United States Supreme Court opinions
indicate that administrative actions can be insulated from judicial review only when a
statute expressly precludes such review. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970);
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-
57 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-141 (1967).
13. Maine I, 563 F.2d 1043 (Ist Cir. 1977).
14. Joined as plaintiffs were the Governor of Maine, its Commissioner of Marine
Resources, and a representative to the New England Regional Fishery Management
Council. Id. at 1045 n.l.
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enforcement of herring fishing quotas established to conform with the
optimum yield determination presented in the preliminary manage-
ment plan, prepared by Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps, for the
Northwest Atlantic herring fisheries. 15 This plan covered two separate
stocks of herring, one close to the coast of Maine (the inshore fishery)
and one farther from the coast (the offshore fishery). 16 For each it es-
tablished an optimum yield, discussing-as the relevant economic, so-
cial, and ecological factors-the need to rebuild the herring stock,' 7
the capacity of U.S. fishermen to harvest herring, 18 and the incentive
of the fishermen to increase their harvesting capacity.' 9 In preparing
the plan the Secretary acknowledged the importance of juvenile her-
ring in Maine's coastal sardine fishery, 20 but her calculation of
optimum yield failed to weigh either that factor or the importance of
herring as a food source for other species of fish. 2 ' The fishing quotas
15. Atlantic Herring Fishery of the Northwestern Atlantic-Preliminary Fishery
Management Plans, 42 Fed. Reg. 10,495 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PMP].
16. The plan designates the inshore fishery "Y'. and the offshore fishery "5Z". Id. at
10,499. The line dividing the 5Y and 5Z fisheries was created originally to separate the
major Georges Bank fishery from the areas where no major fishery existed. This was not
a biological determination. Hearing before the U.S. Dep't of Commerce on the Prelimi-
nary Management Plan for Atlantic Herring, in Peabody, Mass., at 250 (Apr. 19-20.
1977) (testimony by Dr. Vaughn Anthony, biologist at the Northeast Fisheries Center of
National Marine Fisheries Service at Woodshole, Massachusetts) (transcripts of the
hearing available from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as Herring Fishery Hearings]. Despite this arbi-
trary division, there appears to be little intermixing of adult herring between the 5Y and
5Z areas, indicating that the stocks of herring in the two areas are separate. Id. at 221-
22, 258-59.
17. PMP, supra note 15, at 10,524.
18. Id. at 10,526.
19. See note 33 infra.
20. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Service, Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Adm'n. U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Final Environmental Impact Statement/Preliminary Fishery Man-
agement Plan, Atlantic Herring Fishery of the Northwestern Atlantic at 22 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Atlantic Herring EIS]. See notes 52-53 infra.
Ichthyologists define "sardines" as only those fish belonging to the genera Sardina,
Sardinops, and Sardinella. E. MIGDALSKI & G. FICHTER, THE FRESH & SALT WATER
FISHES OF THE WORLD 106 (1st ed. 1976); J. NORMAN, A HISTORY OF FISHES 308 (3rd
ed. 1975). However, for commercial purposes the young of the Atlantic herring (genus
Clupea) having a length of less than five inches are also called "sardines." E. MIGDALSKI
& G. FICHTER, supra at 105. Juvenile herring or "sardines" are found in waters close to
the coast of Maine where they are harvested and marketed as canned sardines. Atlantic
Herring EIS, supra at 22. Once the sardines mature into adult herring they migrate to
deeper waters, joining both the inshore and offshore herring fisheries. See notes 47-48
and accompanying text infra. For management purposes, however, Maine's sardine
fishery is separated from both the inshore and offshore adult herring fisheries. Atlantic
Herring EIS, supra at 22.
21. See notes 48-65 and accompanying text infra.
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provided by the plan allocated approximately two-thirds of the off-
shore fishery's optimum yield to foreign nations.22
Maine's complaint, which challenged only the allocation of the
offshore fishery's optimum yield, alleged (1) that because the offshore
herring fishery was dangerously depressed, 23 the FCMA required the
prohibition of all foreign fishing to allow maximum rebuilding of the
fish stocks2 4 and (2) that the administrative record did not adequately
support the optimum yield determination. 25 The district court re-
22. PMP, supra note 15, at 10,527. The optimum yield for the offshore fishery was
determined to be 33,000 metric tons. id. Of this, 21,000 metric tons were allocated to
foreign nations in the following manner: Poland-5,100 metric tons (m.t.); German
Democratic Republic-4,825 m.t.; Federal Republic of Germany-4,725 m.t.; Soviet
Union-3,400 m.t.; Canada-l,000 m.t.; France-1,000 m.t.; Cuba-700 m.t.; Bul-
garia-100 m.t.; Romania-100 m.t.; others--50 m.t. Maine I, 563 F.2d at 1046 n.3.
The total level of permissible foreign fishing in any fishery must be established pursu-
ant to § 201(d) of the FCMA:
The total allowable level of foreign fishing, if any, with respect to any fishery sub-ject to the exclusive fishery management authority of the United States, shall be
that portion of the optimum yield of such fishery which will not be harvested by ves-
sels of the United States, as determined in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter.
FCMA § 201(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1976). The Secretary must then consider four cri-
teria in determining the extent to which various foreign nations will be able to harvest
that portion of the optimum yield which is beyond domestic fishing capacity:
(1) whether, and to what extent, the fishing vessels of such nations have tradition-
ally engaged in fishing in such fishery;
(2) whether such nations have cooperated with the United States in, and made
substantial contributions to, fishery research and the identification of fishery re-
sources;
(3) whether such nations have cooperated with the United States in enforcement
and with respect to the conservation and management of fishery resources; and
(4) such other matters as the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secre-
tary, deems appropriate.
Id. § 201(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e). The foreign fishing quotas for herring were, how-
ever, established almost exclusively on the basis of past fishing activity of various
foreign nations in the Northwest Atlantic herring fishery. Affidavit of David H. Wallace
at 4, Maine v. Kreps, No. 77-45-SD (S.D. Me. Aug. 26, 1977) (on file with Washington
Law Review).
23. Maine 1, 563 F.2d at 1048. There is confusion in the record as to what the "natu-
ral" size of the stock actually was. The preliminary management plan suggests that the
"optimum stock size" is about 500,000 metric tons. PMP, supra note 15, at 10,520. It
also states that the present stock size is 218,000 metric tons, or just less than 50% the
"optimum size." Id. at 10,527. But the plan also notes that the present stock is only 20%
the size of the herring stock in the middle 1960's. Id. at 10,523. Evidence presented at
the Apr. 19, 1977, public hearing in Peabody, Mass. showed that the greatest previous
stock level was about 1.2 million metric tons, or about 5.5 times the present stock size.
Herring Fishery Hearings, supra note 16, at 214. Other authorities have suggested that
the present herring stock may be as little as 10% of its natural size. Development Sci-
ences, Inc., Working Paper No. 3, Marine Fisheries Stock Assessment: Issues and
Needs 70, in WORKING PAPERS: ESTABLISHING A 200-MILE FISHERIES ZONE (Office of
Technology Assessment ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
24. Maine I, 563 F.2d at 1048.
25. Id. at 1049.
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jected these claims and dismissed the complaint. 26 On appeal, the
First Circuit affirmed the lower court's denial of an injunction, but re-
manded for additional statements from the Secretary of Commerce to
explain the criteria considered in establishing optimum yield. 27 On re-
mand the district court received affidavits which stated that consider-
ation of the possible adverse effects which a reduction of foreign
herring quotas might have on U.S. foreign relations strongly influ-
enced the determination of optimum yield.2 8 The district court found
that the statements remedied the deficiency in the administrative rec-
ord, and that foreign policy was an appropriate consideration in es-
tablishing optimum yield.29 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed. 30
This note will analyze the major issue of Maine v. Kreps, whether
Secretary Kreps fulfilled the FCMA's requirements in her
determination of optimum yield. This issue is discussed in two parts.
First, the criteria expressed in the preliminary management plan are
analyzed in light of the relevant provisions of the FCMA. Second, the
inclusion of foreign policy considerations in the optimum yield calcu-
lations (a factor not discussed in the preliminary management plan) is
analyzed by (1) inferring from the Maine opinion the proper use of
foreign policy in management decisions, and (2) suggesting criteria
which may affect the role of foreign policy in the development of fu-
ture management plans.
This note concludes that the need for rebuilding a fish stock and
the capacity and incentive of domestic fishermen to exploit that fish
stock are appropriate considerations in determining optimum yield.
These considerations should, however, be treated more comprehen-
sively than they are in Secretary Kreps' preliminary management
plan. The FCMA also requires an analysis of the effects a fishing
quota might have on other interrelated fish stocks whether or not
those stocks are under exclusive U.S. control. The effect of fishing
quotas on U.S. foreign relations is an appropriate secondary consider-
ation in establishing optimum yield, but the possible decrease in effi-
ciency of domestic fishermen caused by increased foreign fishing
should be considered as well.
26. Maine v. Kreps, No. 77-45-SD, slip op. at 15 (S.D. Me. July 18, 1977).
27. Maine 1, 563 F.2d at 1051.
28. Maine 11, 563 F.2d at 1054-55. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text infra.
29. Maine v. Kreps, No. 77-45-SD (S.D. Me. Aug. 26, 1977).
30. 563 F.2d 1052 (1st Cir. 1977).
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I. THE PRELIMINARY MANAGEMENT PLAN'S
DETERMINATION OF OPTIMUM YIELD
In the preliminary management plan, Secretary Kreps discussed
three factors considered in determining the optimum yield for the
offshore herring fishery: the need to rebuild the depleted herring
stock, 31 the capacity of domestic fishermen to harvest herring in the
offshore area,32 and the incentive for the fishermen to increase sub-
stantially their harvesting capacity.33 The plan failed, however, to
fully consider the effect of the offshore herring fishery upon Maine's
coastal sardine fishery34 and upon other species of fish which depend
on herring as a food source.35
A. Factors Included in Calculating Optimum Yield
1. The need to rebuild the herring stock
The preliminary management plan noted that the Northwest
Atlantic herring fisheries were in a dangerously depleted condition.3 6
It therefore established an optimum yield which allows the offshore
herring stock to rebuild by ten percent per year.3 7 Maine argued that
full compliance with the FCMA would require banning all foreign
fishing in order to allow additional rebuilding.38 In rejecting this
31. PMP, supra note 15, at 10,524.
32. Id. at 10,526. See Maine v. Kreps, No. 77-45-SD, slip op. at 7-8 (S.D. Me.
July 18, 1977).
33. Although the preliminary management plan only implies that incentive was
considered in establishing optimum yield, PMP, supra note 15, at 10,527, the district
court concluded that "[t] he third factor on which the Secretary based her [optimum
yield] determination is that the incentive to fish for herring in the Georges Bank area
will not truly exist until and unless the inshore stock.., is no longer available ... 
Maine v. Kreps, No. 77-45-SD, slip op. at 8-9 (S.D. Me. July 18, 1977).
Although Secretary Kreps claimed that capacity and incentive were used in calculat-
ing optimum yield, both capacity and incentive might be classed more properly as fac-
tors used in determining the proper allocation of optimum yield between U.S. and for-
eign fishermen. See FCMA § 201 (d), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1976), quoted at note 22
supra. It is possible, however, that both criteria were used by Secretary Kreps in making
the actual optimum yield determination. For example, in determining the allowable
catch which would provide the "greatest overall benefit to the Nation," the Secretary
should balance the needs of the domestic fishing community against other relevant fac-
tors such as the need to rebuild the depleted fish stocks as quickly as possible.
34. See notes 48-60 and accompanying text infra.
35. See PMP, supra note 15, at 10,526.
36. Id. at 10,524.
37. Maine 1, 563 F.2d at 1047-48; PMP, supra note 15, at 10,527.
38. Maine 1, 563 F.2d at 1048.
735
Washington Law Review
claim, the court concluded that because the Act does not prescribe an
annual rate for the rebuilding of depleted fish stocks, the level of re-
building allowed by a management plan does not have to be the high-
est rate possible. 39 Since the court found valid other considerations
which weighed against allowing faster rebuilding (e.g., foreign pol-
icy), 40 it upheld the ten percent figure.
2. The capacity and incentive of domestic fishermen
to harvest herring
By studying the historical herring catch of both the inshore and
offshore areas, the Secretary reached two conclusions: (1) domestic
fishermen lack the capacity to harvest more than 12,000 metric tons
of herring from the offshore fishery, and (2) there is no incentive for
domestic fishermen to increase their offshore capacity because it is
more economical to exploit the herring resources of the closer inshore
fishery. 41 Because the average annual harvest from the inshore fishery
during the past four years has been 35,000 metric tons42 as compared
with a harvest of 3,800 metric tons for the offshore fishery, 43 the Sec-
retary's conclusions appear reasonable. However, due to the very de-
pressed condition of the herring stocks close to Maine's coast, the pre-
liminary management plan established a quota for the inshore fishery
limiting the total harvest for the United States to only 6,000 metric
tons.44 This reduced quota may or may not force the inshore fisher-
men to exploit the more distant offshore fishery. 45 Factors influencing
their decision will include (1) both the need and ability of the fisher-
men to obtain different fishing equipment, (2) the social structure of
39. Id. at 1048-49.
40. The validity of foreign policy as a relevant consideration in determining opti-
mum yield is discussed in the text accompanying notes 66-91 infra.
41. Maine v. Kreps, No. 77-45-SD, slip op. at 8-9 (S.D. Me. July 18, 1977). See
note 33 supra.
42. PMP, supra note 15, at 10,502.
43. Id. at 10,503.
44. Id. at 10,527.
45. The preliminary management plan indicates that possible mobility of fishermen
between the two management areas should be studied in the future. Id. at 10,527. The
plan does not, however, indicate whether its determination of optimum yield incorpo-
rates a consideration of the desire of inshore fishermen to harvest herring from the
offshore fishery. Although the management plan's 12,000 metric ton quota for domestic
fishing in the offshore fishery is a large increase over previous years' harvests, this in-
crease was apparently made at least partially to allow for fishing by companies which
had not previously harvested herring from either the inshore or the offshore fishery. Id.
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the fishing community and its willingness to exploit the offshore fish-
ery,46 and (3) the economics of the herring industry. For example,
higher costs incurred in fishing farther from shore may preclude a
movement of fishermen to the offshore fishery. On the other hand,
higher prices for herring which may result from the lower inshore her-
ring quota may make exploitation of the offshore fishery profitable
despite increased costs. These considerations should have been ex-
pressly discussed in the management plan to comply with the statu-
tory mandate that optimum yield incorporate relevant economic, so-
cial, and ecological factors.47
B. Factors Excluded in Calculating Optimum Yield
1. Maine's coastal sardine industry
Secretary Kreps discussed evidence showing that Maine's coastal
sardine fishery is composed of juvenile herring spawned by the adults
of both the inshore and offshore fisheries.48 Prior to becoming adults,
the juvenile herring migrate to deeper water where they join both her-
46. A discussion of the inclusion of social data in optimum yield determinations is
found in Acheson, Working Paper No. 2, The Role of the Social Sciences in Fisheries
Management Under Extended Jurisdiction 35-38, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 23.
See also E. Miles, G. Rogers, & D. Collinsworth, Procedures and Socioeconomic Data
Needs for Determination of Optimum Yields in Fishery Management Plans 9- 10 (Sept.
8, 1977) (unpublished paper prepared for the Scientific and Statistical Committee,
North Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council) (on file with Washington Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Data Needs for Determination of Optimum Yields].
47. The overly general discussion of "relevant socioeconomic" factors in the man-
agement plan is apparently the result of insufficient data rather than neglect. William
G. Gordon, who as Regional Director of the Northeast Region of the National Marine
Fisheries Service was primarily responsible for the preparation of the preliminary man-
agement plan, stated,
In going through ... the Preliminary Management Plans .... we [were] struck
by the scarcity of hard economic data. Hard data [was lacking] on the contribu-
tions made by fisheries' related activities to the economy of geographic areas ...
the dependence of communities on fishing as a way of life, and ... the economic
viability of the various communities up and down the Coastline.
Herring Fishery Hearings, supra note 16, at 115. Gordon also indicated that the
FCMA's requirement that management decisions be based on the "best scientific infor-
mation available," FCMA § 301(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 185 1(a)(2) (1976), might require that
a fishing industry provide solid documentation of increased harvesting capacity before a
domestic fishing quota could be increased. Herring Fishery Hearings, supra note 16, at
115-18. Although evidence was presented to the Department of Commerce indicating
that the present capacity of U.S. herring fishermen was greater than their fishing quota,
it was not definite enough to support an increase in domestic herring quotas. Id. at 152-
53, 163-69.
48. Atlantic Herring EIS, supra note 20, at 22, 37.
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ring fisheries. 49 Due to this interrelationship, the recent depletion of
the herring stocks may be a direct cause of the poor recruitment 50 of
juvenile herring into the sardine fishery. 51 A successful management
program for herring must take into account the effects the sardine and
herring fishing industries have upon one another.
Although the Secretary acknowledged an interrelationship between
the sardine and herring fisheries, she proposed no regulations for fish-
ing in the coastal sardine fishery,5 2 nor did she consider the effects
upon the sardine industry of the harvest of adult herring from the in-
shore and offshore fisheries when calculating the optimum yield for
the adult herring fisheries. 53 The Secretary failed to propose regula-
tions for the sardine fishery on the grounds that because the sardine
fishery lies exclusively within Maine's territorial waters, management
control over the fishery is vested in that state. This decision was based
on her concluson that under the FCMA "jurisdiction over fisheries
within the territorial boundaries of a state remains with the state un-
less its actions or failure to take action adversely affects implementa-
tion of a Fishery Management Plan."5 4
49. Id. at 22.
50. "Recruitment" refers to the number of fish entering a fishery.
51. See Atlantic Herring EIS, supra note 20, at 37.
52. The Final Environmental Impact Statement/Preliminary Fishery Management
Plan states that "[a] significant catch of juvenile herring forms the basis of the Maine
canned sardine fishery.... However, the regulations proposed in this PMP do not apply
to the ... juvenile herring fishery." Atlantic Herring EIS, supra note 20, at 22.
53. The preliminary management plan's discussion of the "relevant socioeconomic"
factors which were considered in determining optimum yield does not mention the ef-
fects the harvest of adult herring from the inshore and offshore fisheries will have upon
the sardine fishery. PMP, supra note 15, at 10,526.
54. Atlantic Herring EIS, supra note 20, at 22. The Secretary's description of the
limits of federal management authority over fisheries within a state's territorial waters
is based on the provision of FCMA § 306 that "except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, nothing in this chapter shall be construed as extending or diminishing the ju-
risdiction or authority of any State within its boundaries." FCMA § 306(a), 16 U.S.C. §
1856(a) (1976). Under § 306(b) the FCMA establishes federal management of a fishery
within a state's territorial waters only if the fishing in that fishery occurs predominantly
within the fishery conservation zone and the state has taken action or failed to take ac-
tion which would frustrate the implementation of a fishery management plan prepared
for that fishery. FCMA § 306(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b)(1) (1976). With this limitation,
the FCMA affirms exclusive state jurisdiction over fisheries within each state's territo-
rial waters as established by § 2 of the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
FCMA § 306(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (1976). See S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 22 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 655, 678. The
territorial sea of all the coastal states except Texas and Florida extends three miles from
the coast line. The territorial waters of Florida and Texas extend nine miles in the Gulf
of Mexico. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960) (Florida granted 3 leagues);
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (Texas granted 3 leagues).
The effect of the FCMA on state and federal management authority over fisheries
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Assuming that the FCMA does preclude direct federal management
control of the sardine fishery, two factors suggest that the preliminary
management plan should have incorporated a consideration of the ef-
fects its management provisions might have upon the sardine
fishery.55 First, because optimum yield must be calculated to provide
the nation with the greatest overall benefit, 56 management plans
should compare the benefits derived from interrelated fisheries. It is
possible that the overall benefit to the local fishing communities and
the nation would be increased by reducing the harvest from one of
the fisheries in order to increase the harvest potential of the other fish-
ery.57 Second, the FCMA requires that, whenever practicable, indi-
vidual stocks of fish be managed as a unit throughout their range.58
This provision was a response to the realization that conflicts might
within state territorial waters was summarized by the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries:
[T] he Act is not intended to diminish State jurisdiction or to authorize any federal
encroachment over the management or control of any natural resources within any
internal waters of any State.... [However, f] isheries management plans may, un-
der very limited circumstances set forth in [§ 306(b)(1)], regulate fishing within the
territorial sea and supersede State regulations applicable to the territorial sea.
H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-51 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 618-19, and LEoISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051,
1102.
55. Richard Goldsmith, Assistant to the Director of the Pacific Marine Fisheries
Commission, has suggested that the FCMA allows federal planning for fisheries in state
waters. He interprets the FCMA provision which authorizes the Councils to conduct any
activities "which are required by, or provided for in, this chapter or which are necessary
and appropriate to [each Council's] functions," FCMA § 302(h)(6), 16 U.S.C. §
1852(h)(6) (1976), to allow Councils to plan for state waters. He then argues that such
planning is not an infringement of either state jurisdiction or authority. "Planning by it-
self is not an exercise of power; ... it is in the Secretary's implementation of a fishery
management plan that state authority could be threatened." Memorandum from Rich-
ard J. Goldsmith to John P. Harville, Executive Director, Pacific Marine Fisheries
Commission (Oct. 24, 1977) (emphasis in original) (on file with Washington Law Re-
view). Although it is probable that the FCMA does allow federal planning of fisheries
within a state's territorial waters, it is clear that federal regulation of those fisheries is
allowed only under the limited conditions provided in FCMA § 306(b)(l), 16 U.S.C. §
1856(b)(1) (1976), discussed in note 54 supra.
56. FCMA § 3(18), 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18) (1976), quoted at note 9 supra.
57. For example, the environmental impact statement indicates that the sardine
fishery historically has been a major industry in New England. Atlantic Herring EIS,
supra note 20, at 24-25. However, due to a lack of fish, the importance of the industry
has declined steadily in recent years. Id. at 25. The management plan should compare
the number of individuals employed in each industry, the contributions of each industry
to the local and national economy, and the value of each fishery as a food source. If the
harvest of "sardines," see note 20 supra, could be increased by decreasing the offshore
harvest of herring, the total benefit derived from both fisheries might be increased. See
Gates, Working Paper No. 1, Economic Data Needs in Fisheries Management Under
Extended Jurisdiction 4, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 23.
58. FCMA § 301(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3) (1976).
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arise between state and federal authorities over the proper manage-
ment of fish stocks which migrate between state controlled and feder-
ally controlled waters.59 Thus, Congress recommended that state and
federal agencies cooperate in managing fishery resources on a na-
tional or regional scale instead of limiting management decisions to
political boundaries. 60 Future management plans for herring should
therefore incorporate the concerns of state management officials for
the sardine industry to the extent that the harvest of adult herring af-
fects the abundance of sardines in Maine's territorial waters.
2. The importance of herring as a food source
for other species offish
The importance of considering interrelationships among various
fish stocks in determining optimum yield is clearly illustrated when
the species of fish being managed is an important source of food for a
second species of commercially important fish. Although the FCMA
guidelines require that predator-prey relationships among various
stocks of fish be considered in management decisions,61 the prelimi-
nary management plan failed in its optimum yield determination to
discuss the importance of herring as a food source for other species of
fish.6 2 However, environmental groups expressed concern that herring
are a major source of food for Atlantic tuna.63 Low levels of herring
stock in the Northwest Atlantic may cause a decline in the tuna
stock.64 If so, future management plans for herring will be required to
consider the relative benefit derived from both the herring and tuna
fishing industries. 65
59. S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-30 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 655, 684-86.
60. Id. at 685-86.
61. The Guidelines for Development of Fishery Management Plans require that a
management plan "[d] escribe the relationship of the stock(s) with fish, animals, or
plants, including discussions of relevant food chain and predator-prey relationships." 42
Fed. Reg. 36,981 (1977) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 602.3(b)(5)(iii)).
62. For the plan's discussion of optimality, see PMP, supra note 15, at 10,524-27.
63. Atlantic Herring EIS, supra note 20, at 153 (comment letter of Dec. 7, 1976,
from the National Coalition for Marine Conservation, Inc., to the National Marine
Fisheries Service); see id. at 134 (comment at public hearing on the Atlantic herring
preliminary management plan, held at Boston, Mass., Nov. 30, 1976), 180 (letter of
Dec. 27, 1976, from the Emergency Committee to Save America's Marine Resources to
the National Marine Fisheries Service). Optimum yield determinations are required to
consider recreational fishing interests. FCMA § 3(18)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18)(A)
(1976), quoted at note 9 supra.
64. Atlantic Herring EIS, supra note 20, at 153; see id. at 134.
65. Under the FCMA, "highly migratory species," defined as "species of tuna
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II. FOREIGN POLICY AS A RELEVANT FACTOR IN
CALCULATING OPTIMUM YIELD
A. The Maine Court's Analysis
In determining the validity of the management plan before it, the
court in Maine v. Kreps66 had to decide whether the effect on foreign
relations of U.S. fishery management decisions was a proper consider-
ation in determining optimum yield under the FCMA. Two interpre-
tations of the language of the Act were presented to the court.
The interpretation presented by the appellants, and rejected by the
Maine court, is that foreign policy can only be considered in allocat-
ing among foreign nations that portion of the optimum yield which
fishermen of the United States will not harvest, 67 and not in calculat-
ing the optimum yield. 68 Maine's brief cited two facts to support its
interpretation. First, Congress recognized that conflicting foreign in-
terests inherent in the prior international fishery management system
were significantly responsible for the depletion of fishery resources off
the coast of the United States. 69 Thus, conservation of the fish
stocks70 and the needs of the domestic fishing industry7' were made
the primary management concerns of the FCMA. Second, section 205
of the FCMA specifically provides safeguards against economic retali-
atory action taken by foreign nations as a result of U.S. fishery man-
agement decisions.72 On the basis of these two facts Maine argued
that Congress intended to insulate optimum yield determinations from
foreign policy considerations.73
which, in the course of their life cycle, spawn and migrate over great distances in waters
of the ocean," FCMA § 3(14), 16 U.S.C. § 1802(14) (1976), are not covered by the
United States' exclusive management authority. Id. § 103, 16 U.S.C. § 1813. However,
because optimum yield must provide the nation with the greatest overall benefit, id. §
3(18), 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18), consideration of the effect of herring fishing on the tuna in-
dustry is appropriate, even when some of the species of tuna considered are not under
exclusive U.S. authority.
66. Maine 1, 563 F.2d at 1049-50.
67. See FCMA § 201(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1976), quoted at note 22 supra.
68. Brief for Appellant at 11- 12, Maine I, 563 F.2d 1043 (1st Cir. 1977).
69. See H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-42 (1975), reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 606-10, and LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 1051, 1085-93; S. REP. No. 94-515, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 569-573.
70. Section 2(b)(1) of the FCMA states that a major purpose of the Act is "to take
immediate action to conserve and manage the fishery resources found off the coasts of
the United States." FCMA § 2(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (1976).
71. See FCMA § 201(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1976), quoted at note 22 supra.
72. FCMA § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 1825 (1976).
73. Brief for Appellant at 11-12, Maine 1, 563 F.2d 1043 (1st Cir. 1977).
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The Maine court correctly determined that the mandate of the
FCMA that optimum yield provide the "greatest overall benefit to the
Nation" 74 required a different interpretation of the Act. It accepted
the argument that foreign relations could be considered in the actual
determination of optimum yield, stating that there is "no congression-
al purpose that [an optimum yield calculation] disregard the benefits
to be derived from cooperating with other nations. ' 75 However, the
court also interpreted the FCMA to preclude the establishment of an
optimum yield which permits overfishing,76 implying that conserva-
tion of fish stocks should be the primary goal of management plans. 77
Thus, the effect of fishery management decisions on U.S. foreign rela-
tions can be only a secondary consideration in establishing optimum
yield. Because the preliminary management plan fulfilled the primary
goal of conservation by allowing a ten percent annual rebuilding of
the herring stock, the court upheld Secretary Kreps' conclusion that
the United States would receive more benefit by permitting foreign
fishing than by requiring faster rebuilding.78 However, because con-
servation is the primary concern of the FCMA, courts should not up-
hold management plans in which consideration of foreign policy re-
sults in the establishment of an optimum yield that would further
deplete a fishery.
Although the Maine court approved the use of foreign policy in
fishery management decisions, its opinion provides little help to
courts or to the Regional Councils in defining proper limits on the in-
clusion of foreign policy considerations in future management plans.
74. FCMA § 3(18), 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18) (1976). quoted at note 9 supra.
75. Maine 1, 563 F.2d at 1049.
76. Id.
77. Both the language of the Act and the legislative history support this conclusion.
Stated purposes of the Act include the following: "(1) to take immediate action to con-
serve and manage the fishery resources found off the coasts of the United States ...
[and] (3) to promote domestic commercial and recreational fishing under sound con-
servation and management principles." FCMA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 180 1(b) (1976).
The Senate Committee on Commerce reported, "The purpose of the [FCMA] is to
protect and conserve valuable and necessary fishery resources. Fishery resources, which
contribute to the Nation's food supply, economic strength, health, and recreation, are
today threatened ... because of overfishing, and because of the absence of adequate fish-
ing management and conservation practices and controls." S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 655. The
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries also reported that "[t] he purpose
of [the FCMA] is to provide for the protection, conservation, and enhancement of the
fisheries resources of the United States." H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
21 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 593. and
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051, 1072.
78. Maine 1, 563 F.2d at 1049.
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The court did suggest that because 1977 is a transitional year for the
implementation of the FCMA, different criteria might be appropriate
in the development of future management plans.79 In spite of the un-
certainties inherent in the court's opinion, three general conclusions
concerning the use of foreign policy in calculating optimum yield can
be inferred from the opinion and facts of the case. The Secretary or
Regional Councils may consider (1) possible as well as certain effects
on foreign affairs, (2) effects on foreign affairs unrelated to food or
food production, and (3) effects on foreign affairs having no relation
to the regulated area.
1. Certainty offoreign policy consequences
The effects of fishery management decisions on U.S. foreign rela-
tions need not be certain to merit consideration in the establishment
of optimum yield. Affidavits presented to the court by the Secretary of
Commerce80 indicate that those responsible for preparing the prelimi-
nary management plan relied heavily upon speculation that lower for-
eign herring quotas might cause other nations to enact restrictive
trade barriers to U.S. exports or deny U.S. fishermen access to foreign
territorial waters.8 ' Also considered was the possibility that any action
taken by the United States which might be viewed as unreasonable
could seriously jeopardize the potential success of the current United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.8 2 The only concrete ex-
79. In holding that foreign policy is a valid consideration in determining optimum
yield, the court stated,
The commitments [made to other nations before the FCMA took effect] and the
Secretary's response to them reflect the special considerations of a transitional year
and the inauguration of exclusive United States management of this fishery. Differ-
ent considerations would. apply to international agreements made at a different
time under other circumstances.
Maine I1, 563 F.2d at 1055-56.
80. Affidavits were filed by Larry L. Snead, Acting Director of the Office of Fish-
eries Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State; William G. Gordon, Northeast Regional Director,
National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce; and, David H. Wallace, Associate Administrator for Marine
Resources, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce.
The principal affidavit was filed by Wallace. He was responsible for the final action
taken by the Department of Commerce on the preliminary management plan for the
Northwestern Atlantic herring fishery. Affidavit of David H. Wallace at 1-2, Maine v.
Kreps, No. 77-45-SD (S.D. Me. Aug. 26, 1977) (on file with Washington Law Review).
81. Id.at8-10.
82. Id. at 5. A purpose of the FCMA is "to support and encourage continued active
United States efforts to obtain an internationally acceptable treaty at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which provides for effective conservation
743
Washington Law Review
ample of benefit to the United States derived from the foreign alloca-
tion of herring was a favorable trade agreement with the Federal Re-
public of Germany.8 3 By upholding the management plan, the court
allows the Secretary broad discretion, in making management
decisions, to consider the effects on U.S. foreign relations that are un-
certain or may only possibly result from a reduction in foreign fishing
quotas.
2. Foreign policy unrelated to food or food production
Although the FCMA requires that optimum yield be determined
with particular reference to food production, 84 the Maine court
upheld Secretary Kreps' consideration of effects on foreign affairs not
directly related to the production of food. An example is the Secre-
tary's consideration of the adverse effect an abrupt prohibition of for-
eign fishing might have on the economies of other nations. 85 The
court cautioned that our fisheries are not to be traded for a "world
banking agreement," 86 but it acknowledged that reciprocal economic
benefits from foreign nations may be considered in management deci-
sions.8 7 Thus, while the FCMA specifies that factors affecting man-
agement decisions must primarily relate to food or food production, 88
the Maine opinion allows some consideration of effects on foreign af-
fairs not directly related to food production in determining optimum
yield.
and management of fishery resources." FCMA § 2(c)(5), 16 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(5)
(1976). For an examination of potential conflicts between the FCMA and a future Law
of the Sea treaty, see Jacobson & Cameron, Potential Conflicts Between a Future Law
of the Sea Treaty and the Fishery Conservation anzd Management Act of 1976, 52
WASH. L. REv. 451 (1977).
83. See Herring Fishery Hearings, supra note 16, at 102.
84. FCMA § 3(18), 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18) (1976), quoted at note 9 supra.
85. Maine 1, 563 F.2d at 1050. William G. Gordon, the Regional Director for the
National Marine Fisheries Service, testified that the foreign herring quotas were based
on the belief that a gradual phaseout of foreign fishing would be more beneficial to those
countries than an immediate exclusion. Herring Fishery Hearings, supra note 16. at
108.
86. Maine 1, 563 F.2d at 1050.
87. Maine 11, 563 F.2d at 1055-56; Maine 1, 563 F.2d at 1050. See note 76 supra.
An affidavit explained the optimum yield determination as follows: "[Riecognition
was given to traditional foreign fishing in order that any benefit flowing to foreign na-
tions from such recognition might redound to the benefit of the United States, which is
the premise upon which the conduct of foreign affairs relies." Affidavit of David H.
Wallace at 4, Maine v. Kreps, No. 77-45-SD (S.D. Me. Aug. 26, 1977) (on file with
Washington Law Review).
88. Maine I, 563 F.2d at 1050.
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3. Foreign policy unrelated to the management area
The Secretary or a Regional Council is not limited to considering
only consequences on foreign policy that affect the regulated area.
Although the other factors considered by Secretary Kreps in establish-
ing optimum yield by their nature affect the herring fishery,8 9 the for-
eign policy consequences that were considered generally had no rela-
tion to the fishery. For example, the Secretary considered the
possibility that retaliatory restrictions might be levied on U.S. fisher-
men fishing in foreign waters for tuna, lobster, and shrimp if the for-
eign herring quotas were reduced.90 She also took into account the
adverse effect that an abrupt prohibition of foreign fishing might have
upon the economies of other nations.91 The Maine court's acceptance
of the Secretary's consideration of these effects indicates that fishing
quotas established for any region may validly reflect a consideration
of foreign policy consequences having no relation to that region.
B. Use of Foreign Policy in Future Management Decisions
Two factors may affect the role of foreign policy in future optimum
yield determinations. One is the practical effect of the membership
and orientation of the Regional Councils who are primarily responsi-
ble for developing management plans. The second factor is the
FCMA's efficiency requirement, which Secretary Kreps failed to con-
sider in developing her preliminary management plan for herring.
1. Membership and orientation of the Regional Councils
Because the Regional Councils' memberships are industry-based, 92
it is probable that the Councils will not consider foreign policy as a
89. For example, the Secretary considered the need to rebuild the herring stock, the
capacity of the domestic fishermen to harvest herring, and the possibility that the fisher-
men would increase their harvesting capacity. See notes 36-47 and accompanying text
supra.
90. Affidavit of David H. Wallace at 10, Maine v. Kreps, No. 77-45-SD (S.D. Me.
Aug. 26, 1977) (on file with Washington Law Review).
91. Herring Fishery Hearings, supra note 16, at 108 (testimony by William G. Gor-
don, Northeast Regional Director, National Marine Fisheries Service, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
92. Voting membership of each Regional Council is composed of (1) the principal
state official responsible for marine fishery management, FCMA § 302(b)(1)(A), 16
U.S.C. § 1852(b)(l)(A) (1976); (2) the regional director of the National Marine Fish-
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significant factor in determining optimum yield and will be reluctant
to allow any foreign fishing. For example, both the New England 93
and Mid-Atlantic 94 Regional Councils recommended that Secretary
Kreps ban all foreign fishing for herring in the Northwest Atlantic.
Even if the Councils were not biased against allowing foreign fishing,
it is unlikely that the Council members have sufficient expertise to as-
sess effects on foreign relations, especially those effects having no re-
lation to their management region.95
The industry-oriented composition of the Regional Councils will
not, however, preclude foreign policy from being considered in future
management plans. Prior to the implementation of any management
plan prepared by a Regional Council, the Secretary of Commerce
must review and approve it.96 When reviewing a plan, the Secretary is
required to consult with the Secretary of State with respect to any for-
eign fishing in the regulated area,97 and she may amend the plan if she
determines that its provisions do not comply with the FCMA's re-
quirements. 98 It is possible to infer from the Maine opinion that a
failure to consider effects of management decisions on foreign rela-
tions will be a sufficient basis for the Secretary to make such a deter-
mination. 99 Given the bias of the Regional Councils in favor of ex-
cries Service, id. § 302(b)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(1)(B); and (3) members appointed
by the Secretary of Commerce from a list of qualified individuals submitted by the gov-
ernor of each constituent state, id. § 302(b)(1)(C), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(1)(C). Industry
representation comprises approximately 79% of the total membership of the Regional
Councils. Pontecorvo, Fishery Management and the General Welfare: Implications of
the New Structure, 52 WASH. L. REv. 641, 651-55 (1977).
93. See Atlantic Herring EIS, supra note 20, at 198 (comment of the New England
Regional Fishery Management Council).
94. Id. at 194 (comment of the Mid-Atlantic Regional Fishery Management Coun-
cil).
95. For a discussion of the possible implications of the membership of the Regional
Councils on fishery management policy, see Pontecorvo, supra note 92.
96. The FCMA provides that "[w] ithin 60 days after the Secretary receives any
fishery management plan ... which is prepared by any Council, the Secretary shall (1)
review such plan.., and (2) notify such Council in writing of his approval, disapproval,
or partial disapproval of such plan ... " FCMA § 304(a). 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (1976).
97. Id. § 304(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b)(1).
98. Id. § 304(c)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(I)(B). Before amending the plan, the Sec-
retary of Commerce must give the Regional Council opportunity to correct the plan's
deficiencies. Id.
99. A foreign nation adversely affected by fishing quotas established under the
FCMA might have standing to challenge the adequacy of the underlying optimum yield
calculation. Legislative history of the FCMA indicates that Congress intended to give
foreign nations the opportunity to seek review of fishery management plans. The pre-
sent language of FCMA § 305 eliminates the House bill's requirement that only ad-
versely affected states or citizens of the United States could request that public hearings
be conducted to determine the adequacy of a fishery management plan. Id. § 305, 16
746
Determination of Optimum Yield
cluding foreign fishing from fisheries under United States control,
disagreements are likely to arise between the Secretary of Commerce
and the Councils over consideration of foreign policy in optimum
yield calculations. 100
2. The FCMA's efficiency requirement
A significant management objective of the FCMA is to promote ef-
ficient utilization of depleted 01 fishery resources. 0 2 The concept of
optimum yield in the FCMA encompasses more than simply specify-
ing the total allowable catch from a fishery; it incorporates a measure
of the efficiency by which that quantity of fish is caught. 103 The con-
gressional purpose of including efficiency in the criteria for establish-
ing optimum yield was to provide consumers with the best product at
the lowest price while insuring a fair return to fishermen. 10 4
Efficiency is measured by analyzing the effort (or cost) required to
harvest a certain amount of fish. 10 5 Generally, as fishing effort
increases, the cost required to catch each additional fish increases. 10 6
Hence, the efficiency of fishermen exploiting a depleted fishery will
U.S.C. § 1855. Contrast this provision with H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 307 (1975),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 753, 803-06. Also, the term "per-
son" as used in the FCMA is defined to include any foreign government or any entity of
such government. FCMA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1802(19) (1976).
100. The Senate version of the FCMA originally provided for a "Fishery Manage-
ment Review Board" which would hear disputes between the Regional Councils and the
Secretary of Commerce relating to fishery management decisions. S. 961, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 204 (1975), discussed in S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 38-40
(1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 655, 694-97.
101. A fishery is defined as "depleted" when an increase in fishing effort causes a
reduction in that fishery's annual yield. Development Sciences, Inc., Working Paper
No. 3, Marine Fisheries Stock Assessment: Issues and Needs 11, in WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 23. The Northwest Atlantic herring fishery is considered a good example of a
depleted fishery. Vernberg, Working Paper No. 4, A Short Analysis of Stock Enhance-
ment Possibilities for Certain Commercially Important Marine Species 14, in WORKING
PAPERS, supra note 23; H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1975), re-
printed in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051, 1149.
102. The FCMA requires that "[c] onservation and management measures shall,
where practicable, promote efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that
no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose." FCMA § 301(a)(5),
16 U.S.C. § 185 1(a)(5) (1976).
103. See Data Needs for Determination of Optimum Yields, supra note 46, at 2.
104. S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 655, 684.
105. This is generally called a yield-effort analysis. See, e.g., Development Sci-
ences, Inc., Working Paper No. 3, Marine Fisheries Stock Assessment: Issues and
Needs 9, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 23.
106. Id.
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decrease rapidly as the fishing effort increases. Conversely, their effi-
ciency will increase as the total fishing effort decreases. Because the
herring fishery has been heavily exploited by foreign vessels in the
past, the, efficiency of domestic herring fishermen in the Northwest
Atlantic would increase if all foreign fishing in the area was prohi-
bited. Secretary Kreps did not, however, discuss the effect of foreign
fishing upon the costs incurred by the U.S. fishermen in harvesting
herring. 107
Future management plans which permit foreign fishing should con-
sider whether such an allowance will decrease the efficiency of do-
mestic fishermen and whether resulting increases in costs incurred by
the fishermen will increase consumer prices. 10 8 Because an additional
goal of the FCMA is to develop under-utilized fisheries, 109 manage-
ment plans should also consider whether increasing the efficiency of a
fishing industry will increase future investments in that industry.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FCMA's requirement that optimum yield provide the greatest
overall benefit to the nation places a heavy burden on those
107. See PMP, supra note 15. Secretary Kreps did conclude that it is more econom-
ical for domestic fishermen to exploit the inshore fishery than the offshore fishery. See
Maine v. Kreps, No. 77-45-SD, slip op. at 8 (S.D. Me. July 18, 1977). She did not.
however, consider the effect of eliminating foreign fishing on this disparity. See PMP.
supra note 15. Fishermen presented evidence to the Department of Commerce that
lower costs would allow more fishermen to exploit the offshore fishery. Herring Fishery
Hearings, supra note 16, at 182, 187. The fishermen also indicated that the allowance of
foreign fishing had a negative impact on their incentive to harvest herring in the offshore
fishery. Id. at 150.
108. Other economic considerations should include: regional employment fluctua-
tions, impact on the income of those employed in the various sectors of the herring in-
dustry, and impact on expenditures in other industries, especially those with strong con-
nections with the herring industry. Gates, Working Paper No. 1, Economic Data Needs
in Fisheries Management Under Extended Jurisdiction 4, in WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 23.
109. A stated purpose of the FCMA is "to encourage the development of fisheries
which are currently underutilized by United States fishermen." FCMA § 2(b)(6). 16
U.S.C. § 1801(b)(6) (1976).
The North Atlantic herring fishery is considered a good example of an underdevel-
oped fishery. Gates, Working Paper No. 1, Economic Data Needs in Fisheries Manage-
ment Under Extended Jurisdiction 43-44, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 23.
The term "underdeveloped" should not be confused with the term "depleted." Deple-
tion refers to the actual quantity of fish in a given fishery. On the other hand,
underdevelopment refers to the percentage of the total annual catch from a fishery
which is harvested by domestic fishermen. For example, U.S. fishermen accounted for
only about three percent of the total 144,544 metric ton herring harvest from the
offshore fishery in 1975. Atlantic Herring EIS, supra note 20, at 30. Thus, the herring
fishery is both "depleted" and "underdeveloped."
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preparing fishery management plans. Not only must a plan weigh
stock-rebuilding needs against domestic fishing requirements, but it
must also determine if overall benefit might be enhanced by decreas-
ing a fishing quota in order to increase the harvest potential of an-
other interrelated fishery. This would include a determination of a
management plan's effect, if any, on fisheries outside U.S. control,
such as the effect of limiting the herring harvest upon the abundance
of both sardines and tuna. In addition, the "greatest overall benefit"
goal of the FCMA allows consideration of the adverse effect that fish-
ery management decisions might have on U.S. foreign relations. The
influence of foreign policy must, however, be weighed against the
countervailing goals of conserving fish stocks and increasing the effi-
ciency of the domestic fishing industry.
The FCMA represents an important step toward the rehabilitation
of our nation's fisheries. However, as is apparent from the prelimi-
nary management plan at issue in Maine v. Kreps, the largest obstacle
to full compliance with the FCMA is lack of necessary data. Thus, the
quality of future management plans will depend on the improvement
of the data base from which those plans are prepared. Only after the
Secretary of Commerce and the Regional Councils are able to accu-
rately assess the multitude of factors which affect any given fishery
can the concept of optimum yield envisioned by Congress be a suc-
cessful basis for fishery management decisions.
William H. Beaver, Jr.
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